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COMMENT
FINANCING PROFESSIONAL SPORTS FACILITIES
WITH FEDERAL TAX SUBSIDIES:
IS IT SOUND TAX POLICY?
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1997, major league baseball player David Justice earned $6.2 mil-
lion from the Cleveland Indians Professional Baseball Club.' The Club
also paid slugger Matt Williams over $7 million for his 1997 services.2
That same year the Indians collected over $95 million in total revenues
and netted $15.6 million in operating income? In 1994, the Indians
moved into Jacobs Field, a new stadium seating over 42,000 people and
costing $177 million.4 Like most professional sport franchises, the Indi-
ans collected and spent big-time money.
Around 1994, Jim Drinksalot was forced to pay an extra $3.00 per
gallon for liquor.5 About that same time, Jim's friend, Jane Smokes-
toomuch, saw the price of her cigarettes increase by 4.5 cents per pack.6
In addition, around 1994, Bill Bringmeacoldone saw the price for a case
of beer increase by thirty-two cents.7 Neither Jim, Jane, nor Bill watches
baseball, and all of the price increases on these products were due to
new taxes. Like most taxpayers, Jim, Jane, and Bill were unhappy to see
politicians increase taxes.
On the surface, the two situations seem totally unrelated. However,
after closer investigation the truth is quite the contrary. The new taxes
on Jim, Jane, and Bill's favorite treats were levied in order to pay $155.7
million of the construction costs to build Jacobs Field. In effect, taxpay-
ers like Jim, Jane, and Bill are effectively subsidizing multimillion-dollar
1. See Baseball Millionaires, SEATrLE POST-IrTELLIGENCER, Apr. 3, 1997, at D2.
2. See id
3. See Kurt Badenhausen et al., More Than a Game, An In-Depth Look at The Raging
Bull Market in Sports Franchises, FIN. WORLD, June 17, 1997, at 48, 48.
4. See Mandy Rafool, Playing The Stadium Game, Financing Professional Sports Facilities
in the 1990s, LEG. FiN. PAPER 106, June 1997, at 10.
5. See MAXmn J. GREENBERG & JAmES T. GRAY, TiE STADruM GAME 371 (1996).
6. See id.
7. See id. Increased price per case of beer approximate based on 288 ounces per case at a
tax rate of sixteen cents per gallon of beer. See iL
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professional sporting teams by paying for the construction of new sports
stadiums and arenas.8
A. Growth of Stadium and Arena Construction
Any person with their eye on current news has witnessed an explo-
sion in the rate of sports stadium construction in recent years.9 In fact, it
was estimated in 1997 that of the 115 major professional sports
franchises composing Major League Baseball (MLB), the National
Hockey League (NHL), the National Football League (NFL), and the
National Basketball Association (NBA), half had either requested new
stadiums or were getting them.10 Stadium construction has become big
business.1' The amount spent on construction and renovation for the
1990s is projected to have been somewhere between $8 billion and $11
billion dollars, a dramatic rise from the paltry $750 million spent during
the 1980s.12 While this level of spending is eye opening, it is even more
alarming when you recognize who is paying the bill.
B. Historical Cost Trends and Facility Funding Patterns
For many reasons such as facility obsolescence, lack of capacity for
expanding attendance, and competitive balance, professional sports
franchises are requesting new stadiums at an unprecedented rate.13
When a team wants a new stadium, the owners usually complain to local
taxpayers, claiming that without a new facility the team will be unable to
remain financially competitive and subsequently will be forced to field
sub-par teams.14 This is generally followed with a threatening declara-
tion to fans and legislatures that if public money is not used to pay for
8. See William M. Welch, Federal Taxpayers Shut Out of Stadium Payoff, USA TODAY,
May 31, 1996, at 1A. Welch indicates that four out of every five dollars used to finance sports
stadiums comes from public sources. See id.
9. See Daniel J. Lathrope, Federal Tax Policy, Tax Subsidies, and the Financing of Profes-
sional Sports Facilities, 38 S. TEx. L. REv. 1147, 1148 (1997).
10. See Joanna Cagan & Neil DeMause, Field of Schemes, How the Great Stadium Swin-
dle Turns Public Money into Private Profit 28 (1998).
11. One estimate places the amount spent on constructing new sports stadiums at $4.5
billion since 1990 and projects another $5 billion to be spent by the end of the year 2000
resulting in a total of almost $10 billion spent on stadiums in the past decade. See Welch,
supra note 8, at 1A.
12. See CAGAN & DEMAUsE, supra note 10, at 29.
13. See generally Paul M. Anderson, An Analysis of the Economic Impact of Sports Facili-
ties on the Surrounding Community, Midwest State Treasurers Conference, May 28, 1998; see
also GREENBERG & GRAY, supra note 5, at 5-17.
14. See William H. Baker, Sports Law in the 21' Century: Taxation and Professional Sports
- A Look Inside the Huddle, 9 MARQ. SPORTS LJ. 287, 298 (1999).
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the facility, the team will be forced to move.15 It is a buyers market for
professional sports franchises looking for facilities. 6
Deciding whether or not new stadiums should actually be built, how-
ever, can differ based upon who is paying the bill for construction. In
recent years, that party has been primarily the taxpayer. Few stadiums
are still paid for by private party financing, and most are financed with
the taxpayer liable for the majority of the bill, or in some cases the entire
bill. 7 For example, out of a sample of twenty-seven stadiums opened
during the 1990s, an average of sixty-five percent of the costs were
placed on the taxpayer.'" Only three stadiums were entirely privately
financed, while ten were at least ninety percent publicly funded.19 With
an average original cost of $175 million per stadium, the estimated "di-
rect" taxpayer subsidy for 1997 was over $3 billion dollars.20 This was
given to professional sports franchises that brought in average revenues
of $60.9 million per team during that same year.2 '
While one recuperates from the shockingly astronomic amount of di-
rect tax subsidy, it is important to remember that this figure is not repre-
sentative of the total tax subsidy. In addition to direct stadium costs,
taxpayers are forced to subsidize sports facilities indirectly through tax
abatements and other indirect incentives such as infrastructure costs that
are incurred to pay for items like roads, water and sewer connections,
15. Stadiums built in Texas, Baltimore, Cleveland, Chicago, and Atlanta, for the Rangers,
Orioles, Indians, White Sox, and Braves respectively, were built to prevent the teams from
moving. See Ballpark Figures, ARIz. REPuBLic, Nov. 28, 1993, at A18. As an example, The
Ballpark in Arlington, Texas was built following the Rangers threat to leave if a new stadium
was not built. See id. The threats by teams to move if cities do not construct new stadiums for
them has been so pervasive that Senator Arlen Specter has proposed legislation designed to
force teams and leagues to contribute to construction and renovation funds in an attempt to
stop what he has called "legalized extortion." See Proposed Bill on Financing New Stadiums
Gets Negative NFL Reviews, PA. L. WEEKLY, June 28, 1999, at 2.
16. The "buyers market" has occurred because the supply of communities willing to build,
fund or subsidize stadium construction to attract professional sports teams, exceeds the rate of
league expansion and the current number of teams willing to relocate. See John Riley, Fields
of Green, Pricey Palaces a Bonanza for Team Owners, Players, Aiuz. REPUBLic, Sept. 15,
1996, at Hi.
17. See GREENBERG & GRAY, supra note 5, at 357-75. Paying special attention to the
percentage of public financing for stadiums opened after 1986 shows that the burden of fi-
nancing these facilities is generally falling on the taxpayer. See id.
18. See Rafool, supra note 4, at 10.
19. See id.
20. See id.
21. See Badenhansen et. al., supra note 3, at 40 (computed by taking total revenues for all
teams in the NFL, NBA, MLB, and NHL and dividing by the total number of teams).
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and power lines.'2 For instance, from 1976-85 the city of Baltimore tax-
payers lost an estimated $4.75 million on property tax abatements alone
for Baltimore Memorial Stadium. 3
The economics of the whole situation seem to leave one scratching
their head wondering if this tax subsidy is sound policy. After all, why
should the taxpayer subsidize a very profitable private entertainment in-
dustry at a time when other essential public welfare programs are being
reduced or cut altogether as politicians continue to scramble for revenue
to pay for items such as the national debt, the construction of schools
and prisons, and new welfare programs? 24
II. Now is THE TIMi FOR ELIMINATION OF FEDERALLY FUNDED
WELFARE TO PROFESSIONAL SPORT FRANCimsFs FOR NEW
STADIUMS AND ARiENAS
Much has been written on the topic of public financing of profes-
sional sports stadiums and the issue has been considered from many dif-
ferent points of view. Some writers argue the benefits of building
professional sports stadiums, while others consider the financial burden
falling on taxpayers as a result of the stadium construction boom. Yet,
even where many writers argue against all public tax subsidy of stadium
construction, few seem to consider the differences in this tax subsidy pol-
icy from the point of view of federal taxpayers compared to state taxpay-
ers. Furthermore, not all stadiums or arenas are financed with
significant amounts of public tax monies.25 In fact, as previously dis-
cussed, many sports facilities use very little public tax financing.26 How-
22. See Stadium Financing and Franchise Relocation Act of 1999: Hearings on S. 952
Before the U.S. Senate Comm. on the Judiciary 106" Cong. (1999) (statement of Mark S.
Rosentraub, Purdue University), available in 1999 WL 999649 (F.D.C.H.) In his testimony
concerning the proposed Stadium Financing and Franchise Relocation Act, Rosentraub indi-
cates that virtually every new stadium, arena or ballpark requires millions of dollars in new
infrastructure costs. See id.
23. See DEAN V. BArm, THE SPORTS STADIUM AS A MuNicnPAL IrqvESTmrr 35 (1994).
24. See Leotes Marie T. Lugo et. al., Bicameral Body Meets Today on Budget Cuts, Bus.
WORLD, Dec. 14, 1999, at 1.
25. Examples exist in which the stadiums are financed privately such as Joe Robbie Sta-
dium in Miami, Florida, which was 100% privately financed. See Ballpark Figures, supra note
15, at A18.
26. See Harvey Berkman, Skadden's Team Pitches Private Stadium Financing, NAT. L. J.,
Aug. 26, 1996, at B1. Several recent examples exist in which stadiums were totally privately
financed without the use of tax-exempt bonds. See id They include the Washington Redskins
new stadium in Landover, Maryland, and the MCI Center built in downtown Washington D.C.
for the NHL's Capitals and the NBA's Wizards. See id. Altogether, these arenas came at a
cost of more than a half a billion dollars. See id.
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ever, this fact only compounds the confusion. If some stadiums do not
use public tax funding, what justifies the use of federal funds for those
that do; or is this simply a case of bad tax policy?
This troubling question will be considered through the course of this
paper. The answer, that federal subsidy of professional sports franchises
is not sound tax policy, will also be shown through the analysis provided.
In Part III a basic introduction to public financing will be given, includ-
ing a brief review of tax expenditures and exemptions available for con-
struction of sports stadia. Part IV will examine the current arguments in
favor of, and opposition to, this tax subsidy. Part V will show that the
federal funding of stadiums and arenas must be changed, and evaluate
stadium subsidy as it relates to federal tax policy. Finally, Part VI pro-
vides potential measures designed to change the current federal tax sub-
sidy of professional sports facilities.
III. PUBLIC FINANCiNG Now AVAILABLE FOR THE BUILDING AND
CONSTRUCTON OF PROFESSIONAL SPORTS FACILITIES
The public financing of sports stadiums and facilities is so significant
that one may question how these private companies secure public fund-
ing for their facilities. The question is not easily answered due to the
numerous tax exemptions and expenditures for which a sports team may
qualify. For the scope of this paper, four significant categories have been
created to help the reader understand the answer to this seemingly
broad question.
The first two categories deal with the split between federal and state
tax benefits that play a role in public financing. Each of these two sover-
eignties possess taxing power and can award benefits independent of the
other. The next two sections discuss the significant requirements that a
sports franchise must satisfy to receive tax benefits for stadium financ-
ing. The first of these two sections discusses the specific limitations and
requirements placed on private parties seeking public financing for sta-
dium ventures. The latter of these two sections will briefly consider the
judicially created "public purpose" doctrine.
A. Federal: Tax Exempt Bond Financing
One of the most commonly utilized forms of federal public financing
comes in the form of tax-exempt bonds.27 Upon satisfying the require-
27. See Dennis Walters, Tax-Exempt Financings of Sports Arenas are Called Doable but
No Slam Dunk, BOND BUYER, Feb. 11, 1993, at 1.
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ments for exemption, municipal bonds are exempt from Federal Income
Tax.' This exemption includes qualifying bonds issued to pay for sta-
dium construction or renovation. For the issuer, the cost to service the
bond debt is reduced because an interest figure lower than the going
market rate for taxable bonds can be paid while still providing a market
yield to the purchaser, due to the tax exempt effect on interest earned.2 9
While on its face it appears that this is only an advantage for the
bond issuing party and subsequent purchaser, in reality it creates lost tax
revenues that under normal circumstances would be assessed and paid.
To illustrate the effect, consider the following: for a stadium completely
financed with tax-exempt bonds, costing $225 million, and built today, it
is estimated that the lost federal tax revenues will total $75 million over
the life of the bonds."0 This is no small figure, especially when consider-
ing the cost and number of stadiums being constructed.
B. State: Sales Taxes, Tourist Taxes, Other New Taxes; Property,
Income and Other Exemptions
Tax subsidies available on the state and local levels vary more than
those available on the federal level. These tax subsidies include advan-
tages like property tax abatements,3 ' state income tax rebates, expendi-
tures for infrastructure costs,3 2 and repayment of bond debt with general
funds and special taxes.33 The most common forms of special taxes used
to satisfy bond debts are tourist taxes,3 4 special sales taxes,3 5 and sin
28. See I.R.C. § 103(a) (1999).
29. See Todd Senkiewicz, Comment, Stadium and Arena Financing: Who Should Pay?, 8
SETON HALL J. SPORTS L. 575, 584 n.50, n.56 (1998).
30. See Dennis Zimmerman, Tax-Exempt Bonds and the Economics of Professional Sports
Stadiums, CRS REP. FOR CONG., May 29, 1996.
31. In Colorado, the Ascent Entertainment Group, financiers of the Pepsi Center, will
receive an economic development package that includes infrastructure improvements and
property tax deferments. See Al Lewis, Pepsi Center Financing in Place; Revenue-Backed Se-
curities Raised Nearly $140 Million, All From Private Investors, DENY. RoCKY MTN. NEws,
July 31, 1998, at lB.
32. See Berkman, supra note 26, at B1.
33. See Andrew Gasper, Senator Moynihan's Field of Dreams: If You Build it, They Will
Come... But Not at the Federal Taxpayers' Expense, 17 VA. TAX. REv. 341, 366 (1997).
34. In San Diego, the city has pledged $225 million that will come from new tourist taxes
and hotel taxes to finance a new baseball stadium for the Padres. See Kerry M. Fraas, "Bank-
ers Up!" Professional Sports Facility Financing and Other Opportunities for Bank Involvement
in Lucrative Professional Sports, 3 N.C. BANKING INsT. 201, 212 (1999).
35. One example of a city using special sales taxes to finance a professional sports stadium
is Denver, Colorado. See id. at 211. The city of Denver adopted a .1% sales tax to pay for the
construction of Coors Field for the Colorado Rockies. See id. This sales tax used to repay the
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taxes.36 Other sources such as lotteries, personal seat licenses, and ticket
surcharges are also employed to satisfy bond obligations.37
Many states, including Georgia, Florida, Illinois, Louisiana, Missouri,
and Washington, levied new lodging taxes on businesses such as hotels
and motels in an attempt to subsidize sports franchises.38 Other states,
such as Wisconsin, Arizona, Colorado, and Texas, created new general
sales taxes to satisfy bond obligations used for constructing stadiums and
arenas.39 Many other forms of new taxes are available to pay stadium
bond obligations.4" Though the form of new taxes created at the state
level varies significantly, the fact that the taxpayer is required to subsi-
dize multi-million dollar sport franchises does not.41 The taxpayer bears
a heavy burden to subsidize professional sports. As such, one may won-
der what measures exist to provide protection.
C. Limitations and Other Requirements for Public Funding
Congress attempted to place limitations on the tax-exempt status of
municipal bonds used to construct professional sports stadiums when it
passed the Tax Reform Act of 1986.42 To qualify for tax-exempt status, a
debt for Coors field, will now also be used to repay $260 million of government issued bonds
to construct a new football stadium for the Denver Broncos. See id.
36. Sin taxes include taxes on items such as cigarettes and alcohol. See Ballpark Figures,
supra note 15, at A18.
37. See Senkiewicz, supra note 29, at 585.
38. See Rafool, supra note 4, at 11.
39. See id.
40. See Martin J. Greenberg, The Negotiation of Stadium and Arena Leases; A Legal Re-
view of Rental Structure, Sharing of Lease Revenues, Exclusivity, Default and Term Provisions,
National Sports Law Institute, Deloitte & Touche, Sports Venues, Revenues & Values Confer-
ence, 352, Oct. 20-21, 1994. [hereinafter Sports Venues, Revenues and Values Conference
Materials]. Greenberg provides a list of twenty potential tax and quasi-tax revenue streams
considered for financing stadiums: (1) Alcohol and or tobacco Tax; (2) General Retail Sales
Tax; (3) Special District Taxation; (4) Tax Increment Financing; (5) Pari-mutuel Tax; (6) Insur-
ance Premium Tax; (7) Utility Tax; (8) Permit & Licensing Tax; (9) Property Tax; (10) Mineral
Tax; (11) Surplus Property Tax; (12) Property Transfer Tax; (13) Property Donation; (14)
Property Sale; (15) Redirected Tax from Stadium; (16) Special Lottery; (17) Eating & Drink-
ing Establishments, Food & Beverage Sales Tax; (18) Ticket Surcharge; (19) Parking
Surcharge; (20) Room Tax. See id.
41. The following examples illustrate the variety of public funding tax streams: in Texas
the taxpayers will be paying $135 million of the $179 million stadium through a dedicated sales
tax stream; Cleveland's Jacobs Field costing $161million and opened in 1994 will be financed
primarily through "sin taxes" on beer, wine, liquor and cigarettes; and the Thunderdome cost-
ing $138 million and built for the Tampa Bay Lightning will be repaid in part from tourist
taxes on hotels. See Ballpark Figures, supra note 15, at A18.
42. Legislators debating current stadium related tax legislation readily acknowledge the
intent of congress in 1986 to prevent professional sports teams from using tax-exempt bonds
to finance stadiums. See 143 CONG. REc. S994 (Feb. 5, 1997) (statement of Senator Byrd);
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bond must satisfy the Private Activity Test (PAT).43 Under the PAT, a
bond will be tax-exempt when it satisfies one of two tests.44 The first test
is called the "business use" test.45 A bond satisfies this test when no
more than ten percent of the proceeds of the issue are used for any pri-
vate business.46 Because stadiums are used almost exclusively by private
businesses, this test is rarely satisfied. The second test is the "security"
test.47 Under the security test requirements, a bond will be tax exempt
when no more than ten percent of the principal or interest on the bond is
directly or indirectly secured by an interest in the property used for pri-
vate business or payments in respect of the property.4 8
The requirements for tax-exempt bond status adopted by Congress
have had an effect, but not the desired effect.49 With the Tax Reform
Act of 1986 Congress anticipated that it would reduce the level of tax-
exempt bond expenditure for stadia by limiting the exemption status of
Private Activity Bonds.50 The step Congress took in this effort was to
reduce or eliminate the tax-exempt status of bonds issued to benefit pri-
vate business through the adoption of the PAT. The adoption of the
PAT should have resulted in a reduction in the amount of tax-exempt
bonds issued to pay for stadium construction where professional sports
teams were the primary source of bond repayment. Bond service by
professional sports teams or from revenue generated with respect to the
stadium built would have caused the bond to fail the security test. The
bonds would also have failed the business use test where private busi-
nesses, in this case professional sports teams, used greater than ten per-
cent of the bond proceeds. Together, the result should have been an
elimination or reduction in the ability to qualify stadium finance bonds
for federal tax-exempt status. However, following the 1986 reform, pro-
ponents of public stadium financing began to recharacterize bonds in an
effort to continue qualifying for federal tax-exempt status.51
143 CONG. REc. S499 (Jan. 21, 1997) (Senator Moynihan stated "[o]ne of the loopholes we
sought to close in 1986 was one that permitted builders of professional sports facilities to use
tax-exempt bonds.").
43. See I.R.C. § 141 (1999).
44. See id.
45. I.R.C. § 141(b)(1) (1999).
46. See id.
47. I.R.C. § 141(b)(2) (1999).
48. See id.
49. See David Burke, The Stop Tax-Exempt Arena Debt issuance Act, 23 1 LEGIs. 149,150
(1997).
50. See 143 CONG. R1c. S994, supra note 42.
51. See Zimmerman, supra note 30, at 5-6.
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The number of tax-exempt municipal bonds currently issued has
changed very little. Instead, where municipal bond issuers are generally
unable to satisfy the "business use" test, bond security has been altered.
As a result, stadium leases have become very favorable for professional
teams because such a small portion of bond repayment can come from
facility revenue.52 This creates an unfortunate effect. Where municipali-
ties are determined to issue tax-exempt bonds to finance stadium con-
struction, congressional limitations have effectively made it almost
impossible to recoup the cost of financing the stadium from revenues
generated by the stadium. This has left bond issuers searching for alter-
nate sources to satisfy principal and interest payment requirements. 53
One of the sources they found was the taxpayer.
State governments have made taxpayers the funding source for bond
repayment by pledging general obligation tax funds, and special tax rev-
enue streams toward the repayment of bond debt. 4 This effect is the
result of the inability to pledge significant revenue generated by the sta-
dium while still maintaining status as tax-exempt municipal bonds. The
federal government has also placed the burden of subsidizing multi-mil-
lion dollar sport franchises on state taxpayers. It did this by adopting
Internal Revenue Code Section 141 and the PAT, which has effectively
caused state government to look more often to the taxpayer as the
source for bond repayment. The federal government also placed the fi-
nancing burden on the federal taxpayer by allowing a substantial loss of
federal tax revenue due to the continuing availability of tax-exempt sta-
tus for bonds issued to pay for stadium construction.
In addition to the requirements for federal tax-exempt bond status,
illusory protections exist to safeguard taxpayers from new state and local
taxes and tax exemptions. This protection takes the form of voter refer-
enda. Taxpayers have invoked referenda power numerous times at-
tempting to apply popular oversight to legislative action concerning
taxation for sports stadia and arenas.5"
Often times, referenda power is granted to taxpayers in conjunction
with initiative power, through a state constitution, local charter or stat-
52. See Gasper, supra note 33, at 367. One example of the very favorable leases is the
recent rent free lease that the city of St. Louis granted to the Rams in which the Rams were
also given lifetime property tax abatements along with a very powerful escape clause-all at
no cost. See id.
53. See Walters, supra note 27, at 1.
54. See id.
55. See SPORTS, JOBS AND TAXES: THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF SPORTS TEAS AND STAai-
uMs 146 (Roger G. Noll & Andrew Zimbalist eds., 1997).
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ute. Though the legal complexities of referenda power exceed the scope
of this paper, suffice it to say, these governing instruments grant people
the power to propose and enact laws and reject other laws previously
enacted.5 6 This power applies to newly enacted taxes, exemptions, and
expenditures. Wielding this power, taxpayers defeated seventeen of
twenty-four stadium proposals in one survey conducted from 1984 to
1995.57 Where this power is likely to be invoked repeatedly, the effects
of stadia referenda warrant consideration.5 8
With voter initiatives and referenda, the taxpayer seems to have the
tools to effect local legislative decisions that would require taxpayers to
pay for sports facility construction projects. However, even with this
power, opponents to new taxes for stadiums often stand at a serious dis-
advantage to proponents of stadium proposals in terms of financing
available for issue campaigning.5 9 This funding inequality, along with a
lack of time and common purpose, compounds what seems to be an al-
ready slanted debate.6 0 Where larger wallets and deeper pockets often
back proponents,61 they also have the advantage of being the voters' pri-
mary educators on the proposals and wield significant special interest
power over legislatures.62 Where proponents are slow to acknowledge
real economic impacts and total costs, including hidden or indirect costs,
56. See James T. Gray, Issues Surrounding the Creation and Operation of Stadium Author-
ities and Stadium Voter Referenda, Sports Venues, Revenues and Values Conference Materials,
Oct. 17-19, 1996, at 56.
57. See id. at 53.
58. Recent examples of referenda on voter ballots included measures in Cincinnati, Ohio;
Denver, Colorado and San Diego, California. See Election Roundup, STADIUM & ARENA
FIN., Sept. 21, 1998, at 1. In Cincinnati, stadium opponents collected 40,000 signatures in a
three-week period in their efforts to get a referenda measure added to the fall 1998 ballot. See
id.
59. See Gray, supra note 56, at 75.
60. See Matthew J. Mitten & Bruce W. Burton, Professional Sports Franchise Relocations
From Private Law and Public Law Perspectives: Balancing Marketplace Competition, League
Autonomy, and the Need for a Level Playing Field, 56 MD. L. REv. 57, 99 (1997).
61. See Greg Dobbs, Honesty, Morality in the Election, DENY. POsT, Oct. 11, 1998, at H3.
In one referenda campaign, the Denver Broncos poured almost a million dollars into an ad-
vertisement campaign designed to persuade the voters to approve public subsidy for a new
stadium. See id.
62. See Dale F. Rubin, Public Aid to Professional Sports Teams - A Constitutional Dis-
grace: The Battle to Revive Judicial Rulings and State Constitutional Enactments Prohibiting
Public Subsidies to Private Corporations, 30 U. TOL. L. Rnv. 393, 404 (1999). Rubin cites
numerous examples of campaign contributions by professional sports teams in cities where
demands were later made to the public regarding stadium construction financing. See id.
Among the more significant contributions, Herb Simon, owner of the Indiana Pacers, gave
over $70,000.00 to political campaigns in 1996, and Rich Devos, owner of the Orlando Magic,
made $43,500.00 worth of political contributions in 1996. See id.
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the taxpayer is more likely to make uninformed decisions.63 Perhaps if
opponents to taxation for sports stadia had access to more financial re-
sources for issue campaigning, all twenty-four of the proposed referenda
would have been defeated. While voter referenda has had marginally
more impact in protecting the taxpayer than the federal tax-exempt
bond limitations envisioned by Congress in 1986, the campaign funding
power imbalance renders this type of protection open to abuse. How-
ever, the taxpayer protection envisioned with federal tax-exempt bond
limitations and referenda power are by no means an exhaustive list of
protections available to the taxpayer.' As a result, one might ask what
other protective measures are available?
D. "Public Purpose" Doctrine
In addition to the requirements that must be satisfied to qualify for
federal tax-exempt bond status and the general requirements that must
be satisfied to adopt new state and local taxes, opponents of public fi-
nancing for stadium construction also have the protection of the "public
purpose" doctrine. In their efforts to defeat public financing for stadium
projects, subsidy opponents often turn to litigation under this doctrine
searching for additional protection.65 This judicially created doctrine
63. See Critics Say Arena Add is Misleading, UPI, Dec. 27, 1997, available in LEXIS,
News, Wire Service Stories File. In a recent voter debate in Dallas, public funding proponents
issued advertisements warning that a failure by the cities voters to approve new taxes to pay
for a stadium would result in the Dallas Stars hockey team and Dallas Maverick basketball
team leaving town. See ic However, what proponents did not acknowledge was that both
teams were committed by contract to play at the current arena for at least five more years.
See id. A similar situation occurred in Denver, Colorado where voters were threatened with
losing the Broncos if they did not adopt a new sales tax to build a new stadium, when in fact
the Broncos still had twenty years remaining on their existing lease at Mile High Stadium. See
Dobbs, supra note 61, at H3.
64. In addition, specific state constitutional protections often exist that are designed to
protect taxpayers. See e.g., Emeline C. Acton & Mary Helen Campbell, Public Funding of
Sports Stadiums and Other Recreational Facilities: Can the Deal Be "Too Sweet"?, 27 SrnTsoN
L. Rnv. 877, 878 (1998) (citing FLA. CoNsT. ART. VII § 10(c) which prohibits the lending of
public credit to private corporations); Rubin, supra note 62, at 412 (citing constitutional provi-
sions in forty-six states in which the use of public money to aid private enterprise is
prohibited).
65. See e.g., Poe v. Hillsborough County, 695 So. 2d 672,679 (Fla. 1997); Libertarian Party
of Wisconsin v. State, 546 N.W. 2d 424,433 (Wis. 1996); Citizens for More Important Things v.
King County, 932 P.2d 135, 137 (Wash. 1997); Clean v. State, 928 P.2d 1654, 1659 (Wash.
1996); Rice v. Ashcroft, 831 S.W.2d 206,209 (Mo. App. 1991); Lifteau v. Metropolitan Sports
Facilities Comm'n, 270 N.W.2d 749, 751 (Minn. 1978); Alan v. County of Wayne, 200 N.W.2d
628, 680 (Mich. 1972); In Re Opinion of Justices, 250 N.E. 2d 547 (Mass. 1969); Ginsberg v.
Denver, 436 P.2d 685, 688 (Colo. 1968); Bazell v. Cincinnati, 233 N.E.2d 864, 870 (Ohio 1968),
cert. denied 391 U.S. 601 (1968); Brandes v. Deerfield Beach, 186 So. 2d 6, 12 (Fla. 1966);
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mandates that public monies (public funds are derived from taxes) can-
not be spent for reasons other than "public purposes."66 Under this doc-
trine, challengers to public financing for stadiums have succeeded only
twice.67
In one of the two successful challenges, In re Opinion of Justices, the
court found that the legislature is generally the body to determine
whether public purposes exist.68 However, it also found that a multi-
purpose stadium to be constructed for the primary benefit of profes-
sional athletic teams did not satisfy the public purpose doctrine where
there was an absence of standards and protections to ensure that the
athletic teams were not favored to the detriment of other civic activi-
ties.69 In addition, the stadium enabling-act lacked guidance as to the
type of lease arrangements that would be allowed and as to the resolu-
tion of usage priorities.7 ° The court concluded its analysis by holding
that an issuance of municipal bonds secured by tax revenue violated the
state constitution provision prohibiting taxing for "non-municipal pur-
poses. '71 In the other successful challenge, Brandes, the court held that
the City of Deerfield Beach violated the Florida State Constitution when
it issued bonds for the purpose of constructing a 5,000-seat stadium for
spring training use by a professional baseball team.72 The City violated
the State's constitutional provision prohibiting municipal taxation for
non-municipal purposes.73 In its opinion, the court stated, "[t]he mere
incidental advantage to the public resulting from a public aid in the pro-
motion of private enterprise is not a public or municipal purpose .... "I
Even with these two successful challenges, the public purpose doctri-
nal protection is weak at best, because the test for public purpose is very
easily satisfied.75 Courts considering the doctrine generally apply one of
the following two tests: (1) "public ownership" test; or (2) the "public
Martin v. Philadelphia, 215 A.2d 894, 896 (Pa. 1966); Meyer v. Cleveland, 171 N.E. 606, 608
(Ohio Ct. App. 1930).
66. See Libertarian Party of Wisconsin, 546 N.W. 2d at 433.
67. See Brandes, 186 So. 2d at 12; see also In re Opinion of Justices, 250 N.E.2d at 547.
68. See 250 N.E. 2d at 558.
69. See id. at 559.
70. See id. at 560.
71. See id.
72. See Brandes, 186 So. 2d at 12.
73. See id.
74. Id.
75. See e.g., Poe v. Hillsborough County, 695 So. 2d at 672 (former Mayor of Tampa failed
in challenge seeking an injunction against the city of Tampa on claim that tax money and
credits pledged by the city for the construction of a stadium for the National Football Leagues
Buccaneers did not have a public purpose).
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benefit" test.76 The first is a strict interpretation, not often used, man-
dating that public funding can only be used for publicly owned or con-
trolled actions.77 The second is the more common test. Under the
public benefit test, courts consider only whether the expenditure is mani-
festly arbitrary or unreasonable, giving great deference to legislative
opinion.78
Courts are quick to accept the legislative touts of economic and rec-
reational benefit as public purposes without considering the reality or
empirical plausibility of such claims.79 While it is certainly not the pur-
pose of the judiciary to legislate, these easily satisfied tests seem to nul-
lify any protection to the taxpayer that should result from judicial
oversight of stadium subsidy legislation. Interpretation and application
of state constitutional provisions to state legislative enactments seems
wholly appropriate for a state judiciary. Unfortunately, the current pub-
lic purpose doctrine tests seem to relieve the judicial branch of this
responsibility.
Where courts give legislatures such broad deference to determine
what constitutes public purpose, arguments that public tax subsidies for
sports stadiums and arenas lack public benefit will almost always be
more persuasive when made to the legislative branch. 0 This makes the
public purpose doctrine a seemingly good protection with little realized
safeguarding impact.
IV. POLICY FOR TAX SUBSIDY OF PRIVATE ENTERPRISES DOES NOT
COMPARE TO POLICY FOR TAx SUBSIDY FOR PROFESSIONAL
SPORTS TEAMS
When considering whether the use of taxes to subsidize professional
sport franchises is a sound policy, one might consider what government
pays to other private companies in the form of tax subsidization. By
reviewing tax subsidy to other private industries differences appear that
make policy comparisons between the tax subsidy of professional sports
franchises and those of private enterprises difficult.
76. See Dale F. Rubin, Constitutional Aid Limitation Provisions and The Public Purpose
Doctrine, 12 ST. Louis U. PUBL. L. REv. 143, 154-155 (1993).
77. See id.
78. See id at 155; see also Libertarian Party of Wisconsin, 546 N.W. 2d at 435.
79. See Rubin, supra note 62, at 418.
80. See Lifteau v. Metropolitan Sports Facilities Comm'n, 270 N.W.2d 749, 755 (Minn.
1978).
MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW JOURNAL
A. The Public Funding for Private Gain Comparison
The amazing amount of taxpayer money that politicians are handing
out neither begins nor ends with professional sports franchises. Govern-
ment has given out vast amounts of taxpayer money to private compa-
nies.81 Tax subsidy flows to private industry through numerous forms.
Some of the more significant corporate subsidies have included the fol-
lowing: $240 million paid by the state of Illinois to Sears in the form of
land and cash bonuses to prevent relocation; $253 million from the state
of Alabama in the form of tax exemptions to Mercedes-Benz; and $14.3
million to Exxon from Baton Rouge, Louisiana in the form of tax
abatements.82
While corporate America is receiving large tax subsidies similar to
professional sports franchises, specific distinctions make it difficult to
justify the expenditure in one industry based on the expenditure in the
other. The difficult comparison is due, in part, to the significant charac-
teristics that render professional sports a unique industry. The following
analysis of differences between private enterprise and professional
sports, will help illustrate the difficulty in making comparisons.
The most significant distinction is found in the economic dividends
that reward a city hosting a large private company such as Sears. Com-
panies of this size often operate on a global basis.8 3 When the headquar-
ters of such a business are located in a particular state, it stands to reason
that the state will derive benefits from money redirected into their econ-
omy from sales revenue in outlying chain stores and distribution outlets.
Similarly, a company such as Mercedes-Benz certainly does not sell its
entire product in the same location it is manufactured. s' As a result, it is
81. See Peter D. Enrich, Article, Saving the States From Themselves: Commerce Clause
Constraints on State Tax Incentives for Business, 110 HARv. L. R-v. 377, 388 (1996). Enrich
provides several examples of corporate tax welfare. See id. In one example, he points out that
within the past fifteen years, Indianapolis gave United Airlines a government subsidy package
of $294 million to lure the Airline to locate their maintenance facility in the city, and in an-
other example, Tennessee offered General Motors $150 million to persuade it to build a Sat-
urn car manufacturing plant within the state. See id. at 389.
82. See CAGAN & DEMAusE, supra note 10, at 31.
83. As an example, Sears operates 833 department stores in malls throughout the United
States in addition to 1325 stores not located in malls and 1384 independently owned stores
operated in smaller rural markets. See 1980s - 1990s: Sears Today (visited Dec. 29, 1999)
<http://www.sears.com/jspseripts/sears/
ab... @&BV _EnginelD=DGalghkedfghbgfemgcfecfli.0>. Sears also operates over 1600 stores
in Canada and until recently it had interests in stores through Sears Roebuck de Mexico. See
id.
84. Mercedes-Benz operates distributorships in the following countries: Australia, Aus-
tria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
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apparent that money is brought into a region through the form of cost to
construct the facility or rent of existing facilities, worker wages, purchase
of local materials and other similar diffusements. Unlike professional
sport franchises, private companies like the type listed above do not di-
vert money from the existing economy in the same geographical area,
rather, private companies tend to stimulate economic growth by bringing
money into the economy.85
The second distinction between professional sports and private enter-
prise is the type of work. Other than the temporary employment created
for the construction of the facility, jobs created by a new stadium (as-
suming there are any) are usually unskilled, low end, and seasonal.86
Comparatively, jobs created by large corporate firms are more diverse.
While some of the jobs created are certainly unskilled and lower paying,
many are highly skilled, highly technical, professional positions with
higher wages and salaries. Furthermore, these jobs are more likely to be
permanent full time positions because big business does not have an off-
season.
The fact that corporate businesses are more likely to effect the devel-
opment of spin-off companies creates a third distinction. A-professional
sport franchise uses very little resources or raw material input in order to
ready their product for the market as compared to a company such as
Exxon or Mercedes-Benz. Particularly in the case of manufacturing
companies, smaller companies spring up in relatively close geographical
proximity to the major manufacturer to provide input parts and re-
sources. This creates spin-off benefits to the local economy as a result of
the tax subsidy to the larger private corporations.
Finally, a fourth distinction is identified by considering the number of
people receiving direct economic benefit from the tax subsidy. Almost
all professional sport franchises are privately owned, 7 though this trend
Hong Kong, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Russia, Singapore, Slovenia, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Turkey, United Kingdom, and the United States. See Mercedes-
Benz National (visited Dec. 29, 1999) <http:llwww.mercedes-benz.comle/menulgolocall
golocal.htm>.
85. Under the "diversion theory" sports teams do not generate economic growth but
rather they divert money from other parts of a local economy into their private revenue
stream. See Gasper, supra note 33, at 360-64.
86. See id. at 363.
87. In fact, with the exception of the Green Bay Packers, the NFL consists of thirty-one
privately owned teams. See Lynn Reynolds Hartel, Comment, Community-Based Ownership
of a National Football League Franchise: The Answer to Relocation and Taxpayer Financing of
NFL Teams, 18 Loy. L.A. ENr. L.J. 589, 593 (1998). NFL bylaws prohibit public ownership
of franchises with the exception of the Packers because they were publicly owned before the
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is beginning to shift.88 Unlike a company such as Exxon and Sears, ab-
sent direct employment by or ownership of the professional sport
franchise, the individual taxpayer does not have the ability to derive di-
rect economic benefit from the tax subsidy. In the case of companies
such as Exxon and Sears, the individual taxpayer has the opportunity to
purchase shares of the company stock to derive direct economic benefit
from the companys' success. 89 Alternatively, and with very limited ex-
ception, individual taxpayers may not become shareholders in profes-
sional sport franchises through the same type of limited investment.90
As a result, taxpayers are less likely to derive any direct economic bene-
fit from tax subsidy to sport franchises as corporations.
These specific distinctions make it difficult to justify tax subsidy to
professional sport franchises based on the amount of subsidy being paid
to private corporations. This analysis is not an attempt to convince the
reader that tax subsidy to corporations is good tax policy, but rather, to
identify recognizable differences that make comparison of sports
franchises to corporate America difficult. In other words, it might be an
unsound policy to continue corporate tax subsidies, but for the scope of
this paper the only issue under examination is whether it is sound federal
tax policy to subsidize professional sports franchises.
Even though the level of tax subsidy paid to corporate America may
be egregious, this subsidy has very little impact on the sports federal tax
subsidy analysis where the differences between professional sports
franchises and private enterprise weaken any comparisons. At most, ex-
isting private enterprise tax-subsidy does nothing more than provide
shaky ground for a feeble argument in favor of the status quo on the
basis that historical occurrence of the event itself justifies its future con-
rule was passed. See Don Hunt & Brian Edwards, Know the Score; There's Good Reason Not
[to] Be a Fan of a Sports Team's Stock, Cm. TRIB., Nov. 11, 1998, at C1.
88. See Hunt & Edwards, supra note 87, at C1. Several professional sports teams have
completed initial public offerings, making their stock available to the public for purchase. See
id. The most notable professional sports franchises selling stock to the public are the Cleve-
land Indians, Boston Celtics, and Florida Panthers. See id
89. Sears is listed as Sears, Roebuck & Co. on the New York Stock Exchange with the
symbol S. See Market Guide-Snapshot Report for Sears, Roebuck & Co. (visited Dec. 29,
1999) <http://yahoo.market guide.com/mgi/snap/7961N.html>. An individual investor could
purchase Sears stock for $30.38 per share as of December 29, 1999. See iL Similarly, an
individual shareholder may also purchase Exxon stock. Exxon is listed as Exxon Mobil Cor-
poration on the New York Stock Exchange with the symbol XOM. See Market Guide-Snap-
shot Report for Exxon Mobil Corporation (visited Dec. 29, 1999) <http://
yahoo.marektguide.com/mgi/snap/A2144.html>. Exxon stock traded at $83.81 per share as of
December 29, 1999. See iL
90. See Hunt & Edwards, supra note 87, at C1.
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tinuance. However, as history has shown, the status quo is not always
the best position. Ultimately, the policy analysis and decision as to
whether the public sports subsidy should continue must rest on the spe-
cific issues argued in favor and in opposition of this policy as it specifi-
cally relates to professional sports. For this reason, an analysis of the
issues as they relate to professional sports stadium tax subsidy will be
considered.
B. Public Tax Financing for Stadiums and Arenas is Neither
Economically Cost Effective Nor Fair.
1. Economic Factors: Diversion Theory and Inter-City Revitalization
Without fail, proponents claim that by building a new stadium the
city or region will reap significant economic benefits by bringing new
revenue into the city.9' Advocates often claim that strategic placement
of the new arena will revitalize blighted inter-city areas or depressed
economic parts of the region.' While the claim has some historical va-
lidity, proponents do not present the big picture.93 Significant studies
reveal that the projected economic benefits put forth by proponents are
simply inaccurate.9 4 These reports tend to support the opponents' eco-
91. See Zimmerman, supra note 30, at 13; see also Rafool, supra note 4, at 7.
92. Examples of successful revitalization stories include those of Cleveland, Ohio and
Denver, Colorado. See Gasper, supra note 33, at 364.
93. See Welch, supra note 8, at 1A. Thomas Chema, developer of Cleveland's Jacobs
Field, indicated that twenty-eight new businesses employing over 1200 people opened be-
tween 1994 and 1996 within a two-block area of the stadium. See id. In addition, he indicated
that over 500 housing units were planned near the stadium. See id. The history of the down-
town area in Denver, Colorado also provides a historical example of revitalization following
the construction of a stadium. See Antitrust Exemption for Sports Teams: Hearings before the
U.S. Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 106'" Cong (1999) (statement of Richard Horrow, Presi-
dent Horrow Sports Ventures), available in 1999 WL 416777 (F.D.C.H.). Horrow indicated
that twenty-five new restaurants opened in the downtown area following the construction of
Coors Field along with land value increases around Coors Field of almost $25 per square foot.
See id. In addition, Horrow estimates that an additional $20 million was spent in the down-
town Denver area in the year following the opening of Coors Field. See id.
94. See Robert Baade, Stadiums Professional Sports & Economic Development, Assessing
the Reality, Heartland Inst. Policy Study, 62 (Apr. 4, 1994) <http:l/www.heartland.org/studies/
sports/Baade2-sum.htm>. Not only have their not been any economic studies revealing posi-
tive impacts, in one article the author indicates that of thirty professional sports stadiums built
within a ten year period none had a significant impact on per capita income and three of the
thirty actually had a negative effect. See Adam Safir, Note, If You Build it They Will Come:
The Politics of Financing Sports Stadium Construction, 13 J.L. & POL. 937, 953 (1997) (citing
Dennis Zimmerman, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERvicE, Tax-Exempt Bonds and the Eco-
nomics of Professional Sports Stadiums 16 (1996)). Similarly, three prominent economists,
Professor Dean Bairn, Professor Robert Baade and Professor Roger Noll, all indicate that
MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW JOURNAL
nomic diversion arguments. 95 History has also shown that the economic
revitalization theory has validity, but is it worth the cost? Remember
that the inner city is revitalized at the cost of foregoing improvement of
the economy in other parts of the city.
Economists have theorized that what actually happens is that instead
of generating economic growth, stadium projects merely divert economic
resources from other parts of the city or local geographic region. New
stadiums do not increase the local revenue pie; they merely change the
way the pie is divided and allocated. When bonds are paid from general
tax revenues, money that would be spent on other projects is diverted. If
the taxpayers were not paying for the construction of new sporting ve-
nues, it is reasonable to think that more funds would be available for the
construction of schools, prisons, roads, and highways. This suggests that
the same construction workers would have employment in the commu-
nity, but on different projects.
Even absent the economic growth, where the inter-city revitalization
argument certainly has plausibility and historical support, one may argue
that this revitalization alone justifies the use of tax subsidy to construct
stadiums and arenas.96 However, this argument is short sighted.
Although it may be a rational decision for legislatures to adopt policy
and levy specific taxes aimed at revitalizing blighted areas, the decision
to accomplish this through stadium subsidization may not be the best
possible decision. There are other options that may be adopted which
could have the same revitalizing effect while costing the taxpayer much
less. Because of the other potential economic revitalization plans that
exist which could accomplish the same benefit at perhaps a lower cost,
the revitalization argument should not be outcome determinative.
2. Should Taxpayers Provide a $127,000.00 Subsidy for a Seasonal,
Minimum Wage Job?
Among the more popular arguments the proponents of public sub-
sidy for stadium construction assert is that by providing tax subsidy to
build stadiums the city or government is helping to revitalize or boost
economic growth through job creation.97 Specifically, proponents argue
that by constructing stadiums new jobs will be created for construction
sports stadiums generally do not have any significant positive impact on the cities or local
areas in which they are constructed. See Gasper, supra note 32, at 360-64.
95. See Gasper, supra note 32, at 363.
96. The example of Cleveland, Ohio provides historical validity that stadiums may revital-
ize inter-cities or blighted areas. See Welch, supra note 8, at 1A.
97. See Zimmerman, supra note 30, at 13; see also Rafool, supra note 4, at 7.
[Vol. 10:425
2000] FINANCING SPORTS FACILITIES WITH TAX SUBSIDIES 443
workers, athletes, managers, team executives, stadium employees, and
throughout the community, because of an increase in economic
activity.98
Because of the diversion of economic resources, this suggestion is
questionable. In addition, many new stadiums are being constructed in
cities and areas that already have stadiums.99 Construction in these ar-
eas amounts to nothing more than stadium replacement. These existing
teams already have athletes, managers, and team executives. The only
entity that can effectively create new jobs in this area is the sport league
itself by adding teams. While this has happened, the rate of expansion is
held fairly tightly to ensure that team revenues, athletic talent, and fans
per team are not thinned."o Furthermore, workers are already em-
ployed at the current venues. Therefore the number of jobs directly cre-
ated will have no significant increase, if any at all.
Even if one sets aside the diversion argument for a moment, and pre-
tends that some marginal level of jobs are created by sport facility
projects in areas not currently hosting professional sport franchises, the
jobs created are simply not worth the cost. The cost per job created
significantly outweighs the benefit of creation. For example, consider
the following: the State of Maryland paid $177 million toward the con-
struction of a stadium in Baltimore.1 1 Assuming the 1394 jobs propo-
nents claim were created were not the result of economic diversion, the
publicly subsidized cost per job amounts to $127,000.00.102 This number
quickly escalates when one considers hidden and indirect costs. To add
perspective, the Maryland Sunny Day Fund economic development pro-
gram created jobs at an average per job cost of $6,250.00 during the
same period. 0 3
While the direct economic cost per job alone provides ample basis to
seriously question the wisdom of expending millions of dollars to create
new employment, when one considers the type of work created it quickly
becomes clear that this may be an example of poor legislative judgment.
98. See Rafool, supra note 4, at 7.
99. Recent examples include Safeco Field in Seattle, Washington; Pacific Bell Park in San
Francisco, California; Miller Park in Milwaukee, Wisconsin; Paul Brown Stadium in Cincin-
nati, Ohio; and the Pepsi Center in Denver, Colorado. See Kent Somers, In The Public Arena;
Sports Facilities on Taxpayers' Tab, ARiz. REPUBLIC, May 8, 1999, at Al.
100. See Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., Article, The Antitrust Rationale for the Expansion of
Professional Sports Leagues, 57 Omo ST. LJ. 1677, 1717 (1996).
101. See Zimmerman, supra note 30, at 15.
102. See iL
103. See id.
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Not one single sport team plays the entire year.10 4 Not one single sta-
dium or arena is used every business day of the year."0 5 As a result,
these jobs are generally lower paying, seasonal jobs.0 6 Furthermore, the
type of work is generally non-technical, and requires little or no skill,
unless you consider the ability to hit a fan with a bag of peanuts from
several rows away or the ability to balance a tray full of beer while scal-
ing a flight of stairs, a skill. At a time when companies are struggling to
attract workers as the available labor pool shrinks,0 7 it seems ludicrous
that a state would pay such a large sum of money to create more low-end
jobs.
One will note that this does not refute the fact that at the very least,
potentially higher paying, new short-term construction jobs will be cre-
ated to erect the facility. Facially this seems correct, but after more
thoughtful consideration, this assertion appears hollow. If one accepts
the economic diversion theory, these jobs are really not new, but rather
are a result of other projects that did not occur because funding went to
104. At one end of the spectrum, a team in the National Football League would have the
fewest number of games at a home facility. NFL teams begin playing preseason games in
early August and conclude the regular season schedule at the end of December. See NFL.com
1999 NFL Schedule (visited Jan. 1, 2000) <http://www.nfil.com>. If a team played a normal
preseason schedule of five games and regular season schedule of sixteen games, the most
games that it would host at home is eleven. See id. If the team were good enough to make the
playoffs it may play an additional two games at home, bringing the total games played at home
to thirteen. See id. At the opposite end of the spectrum, a major league baseball team would
play the most games at home stadium during a given year. For example, the Chicago Cubs
host eighty-one home games at Wrigley Field during a regular season. See Chicago Cubs 2000
Season Schedule (visited Jan. 1, 2000) <http://www.cubs.com/tickets/cal2000.htm>. Assuming
Hell actually froze over and the Cubs made it to the World Series, they may host an additional
eleven games at home if every playoff series were played out to its maximum number of
games and the club had home field advantage for each series. This would result in a total
number of home games played of ninety-two. At some point between the number of games
played by a team in the NFL and MLB, fall the teams in the NHL and NBA. In the NBA, a
season begins with preseason games in early October and ends with the championship series
at the end of June. This may result in a team playing four preseason games at home, forty-one
regular season home games and an additional fifteen home games if the team owned the home
court advantage and played the maximum number of games in each playoff series on its way
to a championship. See NBA.com Basics: Complete 1999-2000 Schedule (visited Jan. 1, 2000)
<http://wvw.nba.com/Basics/01126850.html>. In the NHL, the season begins in September
and runs through June. A team in this league may host forty-one regular season games. See
NHL.com 1999-2000 Regular Season Schedule (visited Jan. 1, 2000) <http://www.nhl.com/
schedule/presked.htm>.
105. None of the four major professional sports leagues play games the full year round.
106. Examples of the low-end jobs created, if any, may include positions such as vendors,
parking lot attendants, ushers and ticket booth operators.
107. See Rich Miller, The Labor PooL" Why Greenspan is Worried, Bus. Wk., Dec. 6, 1999,
at 46, 46.
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the stadium instead. Even if the reader is reluctant to accept the weight
of the real economic studies, at most these construction jobs are tempo-
rary, and often times the workers are temporary transplants from other
states.
3. Infrastructure Costs
When debate surfaces for the potential tax subsidy of stadium and
arena projects, the focus is almost always on direct costs. Certainly the
taxpayer and general public have an interest in the level of direct spend-
ing required of them, but frequently the debate fails to give due atten-
tion to the larger picture. Proponents of the status quo are slow to
acknowledge the hidden additional costs that lay in the required con-
struction of basic infrastructure.108 These same parties are also hesitant
to either admit or acknowledge the level of revenue that is lost to fore-
gone tax revenue from abatements and exemptions.
The advocates for public financing cause me to reminisce about the
time my dad explained to me that the cost of going to the amusement
park was more than the twenty dollar price of admission. He explained
how I should consider extraneous circumstances in deriving the total cost
of my planned day of frolic. The price of admission was a significant
concern, but it was not all. A trip would cost gas money - ten dollars -
in addition to the price for games and concessions while in the park,
another twenty to thirty dollars. In addition, I had to think about the
amount of money that I would lose from not working that day, maybe
thirty to fifty dollars. All totaled, the price of going to the amusement
park was probably closer to eighty or a hundred dollars in direct and
indirect costs. This was far different from the twenty dollars I thought I
could afford.
Similarly, while proponents want to put tidy price tags on the cost for
stadium projects, they rarely want to add the price for hidden costs that
necessarily arise with the progression of construction. The level of sub-
sidy is higher than the price tag on the stadium, which adds to the impact
on taxpayers. When the issue rises to a level of debate, it is absolutely
necessary to consider the full financial impact. Ironically, proponents
are fast to talk of projected financial spin-off benefits, but slow to in-
clude all of the spin-off costs.
108. One prominent economist concluded that stadiums financed with municipal bonds
almost always resulted in wealth transfers away from the taxpayers in the form of unrecovered
construction costs. See Gasper, supra note 33, at 360. (Gasper cites Dean Baim's economic
study of financial impact from sports stadiums).
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4. Inequality of Funding Burden: Why Should Non-Sports Fans Fund
the Teams' Stadium?
Who is paying for these stadiums anyway, and, furthermore, who is
really benefiting from them? If the proponents of public financing argue
that the use of tax benefits to pay for stadiums and arenas is a public
purpose, and, therefore justified, why then is the public not paying for it?
With the traditional methods for satisfying bond debt often being special
taxes, small groups are often singled out and forced to bear the burden
of paying for what legislatures tout as the public's greater benefit.10 9
Smokers, drinkers, tourists, and limited consumers bear a dispropor-
tional amount of the burden of satisfying public finance obligations for
stadium projects.110 While it can be argued that limited consumers in
restricted geographic regions receive greater benefits from an operating
stadium simply by juxtaposition, it is difficult to believe that smokers or
drinkers necessarily derive any greater level of reward from a stadium.
Moreover, opponents argue that tourists make up a very small propor-
tion of game patrons, yet they pay an unusually high proportion of the
costs through tourist taxes.
5. Ego: Preventing Team Movement and City Status
The debate over using tax funding to construct new stadia has often
encompassed the argument of whether having a professional sports
franchise brings qualitative benefits to a city not easily measured in
terms of job creation or economic impact.' Proponents often take the
position that a city gains some indefinable status for having a sports
franchise." 2 They claim that having a major league sports franchise im-
proves and strengthens civic reputation, and attracts expanding business
and industry to their area." 3 They argue that this status pays dividends
109. As an example, in Milwaukee, 'Wisconsin $160 million of the costs of the Milwaukee
Brewers new Miller Park will be paid for by citizens within a five-county area through a tenth-
cent sales tax increase. See Somers, supra note 99, at Al. Curiously enough, however, legisla-
tures placed such a heavy burden on the small geographic group while declaring that the new
ballpark would "serve a statewide public purpose by 'encouraging economic development and
tourism, by reducing unemployment and by bringing needed capital into the state for the
benefit and welfare of people throughout the state."' Libertarian Party of Wisconsin, 546 N.W.
2d at 434 (citation omitted).
110. See GREENBERG & GRAY, supra note 5, at 357-75; see also Somers, supra note 99, at
Al.
111. See Zimmerman, supra note 30, at 8.
112. See id.
113. See id.
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to the city that are not easily quantifiable, such as the number of times
the city's name appears in the media because of the sporting team.
114
Facially this argument seems to have solid reasoning, but closer anal-
ysis reveals flaws in its foundation. The shortcomings in reasoning may
give the taxpayer reason to dismiss the qualitative claims argument.
Although local entertainment options are sometimes a minor considera-
tion in business relocation, the claim that major league business is at-
tracted by major league sporting franchises may be unrealistic from a
monetary prospective. If the city is dolling out hundreds of millions of
dollars to sports franchises for the construction of sporting stadiums,
what amount of tax rebates and expenditures can the city afford to grant
to prospective business? This question implies that the budgetary pie is
only so large, and that at some point government will be unable to con-
tinue to pay out or allow such heavy tax benefits.
Although taxpayers would probably agree that having a sporting
franchise brings exposure to the host-city, a second flaw may be that not
all of the exposure is good. When a team consistently loses, will the city
be thought a loser? When local athletes run into trouble with the law or
perpetrate generally unethical behavior upon society is the exposure a
benefit to player's host city? Perhaps the effects of positive and negative
exposure are counteractive. 115 Where a city or region might gain some
advantage from notoriety, the benefits might face counteractive forces.
Finally, assuming some immeasurable, intangible benefit exists in the
pride the public feels for their team, or in the exposure the city receives
because of its team, one must question whether the cost is worth the
114. See id.
115. Examples are widespread of negative exposure to cities as a result of athletes associ-
ated with professional teams. Few people could forget the news coverage and association of
Latrell Sprewell with the Golden State Warriors following his infamous choking of P.J. Car-
lesimo. See Todd Jones, America's Most Hated, These Sports Figures Top the Hit List, COLUM-
BUS DISPATCH, Nov. 5, 1999, at 7D. A less engrossing example, but one of equally negative
association and exposure, may include Darryl Strawberry who has continually been tied with
drug abuse and New York having played for both the Mets and Yankees. See id. Negative
exposure and association with a team and its host city may even last longer than the associa-
tion of the poor behavior with the actual athlete. While considering a sex-related legislative
bill in Utah, State Representative Lowell Nelson indicated his desire to "have some penalty
for cases like that involving players on the Portland Trailblazers." Bob Bernick Jr. & Jerry
Spangler, Legislature Considers Flurry of Sex-Related Bills, DEsERT NEWS (Salt Lake City,
Utah), Feb. 10, 1997, at B2. Nelson was referring to an incident several years past making
news when several members of the Portland Trailblazers basketball team picked up underage
girls at a mall and had sex with them. See id. The negative exposure risk is also not limited to
that brought only as a result of deviant behavior by the teams athletes. See Former Nets
Employee Convicted of Bank Fraud, TAMPA TRm., Sept. 25, 1997, at 8.
MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW JOURNAL
benefit. Similar to the case of the diversion argument, one should con-
sider whether there are other investments that could generate a similar
or greater level of exposure and public pride. For the sake of argument,
and as an example, the construction of a local zoo may provide many of
the same intangible benefits at a much lower cost. A zoo could be a civic
focal point for uniting community interest and increasing civic pride. It
could serve as a place for family recreation and enjoyment. Addition-
ally, a zoo would also likely have the same attractive effect, if any, for a
company considering relocation to the host community area as would a
professional sports team. A zoo may also have the same ability to attract
broader attention by hosting special attractions such as rare touring
animal exhibits. And while it is true that a zoo animal may act unruly at
times, it is likely that most, if not all of the public exposure generated by
a local zoo would be positive.
Assuming that some intangible benefit exists from this type of public
project, subsidization of professional sports stadiums is not justified by
the mere existence of the benefit where the same advantage could be
derived through alternate means. If other opportunities exist that can
generate similar or even greater qualitative benefits at the same or lower
level of tax subsidy, then the existing professional sport franchise subsidy
based on this specific benefit becomes an unsound judgment.
The above arguments show that the tax-policy relating to the subsidy
of professional sports is questionable. As a result, Legislatures should
be leery of courting franchises with the charms of taxpayer subsidy. 116
C. Historical Lessons Relating to Stadium Construction
The real difficulty with many of the arguments is that tax opponents
are often cast as anti-stadia. Proponents place their opposition into the
unfair position of arguing that stadiums should not be built, or that stadi-
ums will not bring the qualitative and quantitative benefits claimed.
While the above material demonstrates that there are significant argu-
ments in favor and in opposition to the construction of new stadiums, the
reader must not lose sight of the real issue and be lured into considera-
tion of the benefits and detriments of new stadiums. Instead, the reader
should focus on the question of whether it is sound tax policy to subsi-
dize professional sports franchises in this manner. In other words, the
116. Professional sports franchise owners wield much negotiating power in the struggle
with politicians over public funding for stadiums which has resulted in many of the benefits of
the tax subsidy being shifted to the franchise owners and away from the public. See Gasper,
supra note 33, at 367.
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issue is not whether stadia should be built, but rather, who should bear
the financial burden of paying for them. History has shown that this
should not necessarily be the taxpayer.
Consider the case of the NBA's Utah Jazz. When attendance de-
mand outgrew the existing 12,444-seat Salt Palace, the Jazz decided to
build a new home.117 The 19,911-seat Delta Center opened in 1991.118
The arena seemed to strike an equitable balance between the pull from
tax opponents and tax proponents. The stadium was built at a very rea-
sonable cost of $90 million dollars.119 This figure may have been held in
check because Jazz owner Larry H. Miller was able to get only minimal
public financing for his stadium. 2 ° As a result, Miller put his own
money on the line and perhaps was more cost conscious than he might
otherwise have been had the Utah Legislature given him a blank check
from the taxpayers' account to build his arena. Salt Lake City and the
State of Utah did aid Miller by donating land and absorbing basic infra-
structure costs.' 21 The effects on federal taxpayers were minimal, the
state and local taxpayers saw no new direct tax increases and the team
received a new arena.
This case study suggests that professional sports facilities can be built
without requiring the taxpayer to pay for them. Utah is concededly the
smallest market in the NBA, yet the Jazz found a way to finance a new
stadium with very little effect on taxpayers. The $90 million price tag
was significantly lower than the current price of new venues, but con-
sider all of the added amenities that are being included in the new
parks. 2 At Bank One Ballpark, in Arizona, the baseball stadium in-
cludes a swimming pool in the left field bleachers. z3 In the Ball Park at
Arlington-new home of the Texas Rangers-many describe the con-
117. See UPI, Jazz Owner Wants Home Court with 18,000 Seats, L. A. TMIEs, June 12,
1988, at 4.
118. See Rafool, supra note 4, at 35.
119. See GREENBERG & GRAY, supra note 5, at 372.
120. As is typical, the exact amount of public subsidy is not completely clear. In one pa-
per, the author indicates Miller received no public financing, and several pages later in the
same article the author indicates Miller received $24 million in tax increment bonds Compare
Rafool, supra note 4, at 10; with Rafool, supra note 4, at 35. See also GREENBERG & GRAY,
supra note 5, at 373.
121. See Somers, supra note 99, at Al.
122. See id. Somers provides the cost of fifteen new stadiums to be opened by the end of
the year 2000 with $158 million for Centennial Arena, home of the NHL Carolina Hurricanes,
being the lowest price and $415 million for Safeco Field, future home of the Seattle Mariners,
being the highest price. See icL
123. See Sam Howe Verhovek, Doomed Domes of the 'Old' Diamonds, N. Y. Tnams, July
13, 1999, at A14.
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course as a mall like atmosphere with numerous shops and restaurants
that occupy space.124
It is undisputed that a $90 million stadium might be unrealistic in
today's market, especially in cities such as Chicago'2 and New York.126
The point, however, remains the same. Stadiums and arenas can be built
with little or no tax subsidization and those parties erecting the facilities
will be more cost conscious. Where stadiums are likely to cost more in
larger markets, the potential to finance them with very little or no tax
subsidy remains.
Consider the case of the Chicago Bulls. The Bulls moved into the
21,711-seat United Center in 1994.127 Partly because it was built in the
larger city of Chicago, Illinois, the United Center came with a much
higher price tag then the Delta Center in Salt Lake City, Utah.128 The
stadium cost $175 million. 12 9 The significant point of this illustration is
that, even in a large city such as Chicago, and even with a price tag of
$175 million, the stadium was built with less than ten percent public fi-
nancing.130 This supports the contention that stadiums and arenas can
be built with little or no tax subsidy.
Consider the second historical lesson: old stadiums are not necessar-
ily bad. Few fans would argue that a park such as Wrigley Field in Chi-
cago should be replaced, yet the stadium is over eighty years old.' 3'
Stadiums are more than a facility for playing sports. Many stadiums and
arenas are historical treasures, housing memories and tradition of times
past. Even beyond the questionable qualitative benefits, playing in older
stadiums is not necessarily financially or competitively disadvantageous
to a team. Consider also the case of the San Francisco 3Com Park (for-
merly Candlestick Park).
3Com Park is home of the San Francisco 49ers NFL team and the
San Francisco Giants MLB team. In 1998, the Giants ended the season
124. See Senkiewicz, supra note 29, at 578 (citing Tony Grossi, The Sprawipark is More
Like It... The Rangers Bring Us Mall Ball, PLAw DEALER REP., Mar. 31, 1994).
125. One recent estimate places the cost of only renovating Soldier Field in Chicago at
$450 to $500 million. See John A. Holabird, Jr., Talking Architecture: Should Soldier Field be
Saved? The Answer is No, CRAnjN's Cm. Bus., Aug. 30, 1999, at 11, 11.
126. One estimate places the cost of building a new stadium for the New York Yankees at
$1.08 billion. See Gasper, supra note 33, at 359.
127. See Rafool, supra note 4, at 23.
128. See id.
129. See id.
130. See id.
131. Wrigley Field, originally named Weeghman Park, was built in 1914. See Fred Mitch-
ell, Macphail: Older Could Mean Better For Cubs, Cm. Tnm., June 1, 1999, at N3.
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tied with the Chicago Cubs for the wildcard playoff spot. In 1997, the
Giants collected the seventeenth most revenue in MLB. 32 The 49ers
have been a perennial playoff team, and as recent as 1998 contended for
the National Football Conference Championship. 33 The 49ers collected
$85.9 million in total revenue for 1997, third most in the NFL.13 4 To-
gether, these numbers tell a story that new stadium proponents do not
want you to know. Teams can bring in revenue and remain competitive
in older stadiums. Yet even this financial and competitive success, when
the season opens in the year 2000, the Giants baseball club will be mov-
ing into the new $255 million Pacific Bell Park.13-
V. TAx-EXEMPT BoND STATUS FOR PROFESSIONAL SPORTS STADIUM
CONSTRUCTION IS UNJUSTIFIED FEDERAL TAX POLICY
Besides the distinction that has been discussed between corporations
and professional sports, the public tax subsidy issue may be narrowed
further by considering the differences in tax policy from a federal versus
a state perspective. The issue of whether taxes should be used to fund
the construction of sports arenas takes on a slightly different perspective
when consideration is undertaken on a state versus a federal level. Gen-
erally, it is more believable that taxpayers at a local level would derive
greater benefit from a new sports stadium in their community than any
one taxpayer on the national level would receive simply from the addi-
tion of a new sporting arena, or as is more often the case, the replace-
ment of an existing arena within the United States. For this reason, and
because the arguments by stadium subsidy proponents have not been
disproved entirely, some marginal level of tax subsidy may be justified at
the state and local levels. However, the same cannot be said for the
federal level.
Some people have argued that federal stadium subsidy is unjustified,
basing their arguments on what appears to be a lack of historical evi-
dence to support the economic claims of stadium subsidy proponents.1 36
However, the analysis of the federal stadium subsidy issue need not
132. See Badenhausen et al., supra note 3, at 47.
133. See NFL: List of NFC Champions, AAP NEWSFEED, Jan. 10, 1998, available in
LEXIS, News, Wire Service Stories File.
134. See id. at 49. Although revenue does not equal profitability, profitability in profes-
sional sports is largely tied to a teams ability to manage its greatest expense-payroll.
135. See Dana Gelin, San Francisco Giants, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED PRESENTS, Mar. 11,
1998, at 110, 110.
136. See Burke, supra note 49, at 153; Gasper, supra note 33, at 360; Lathrope, supra note
9, at 1153.
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reach this point. Even if the economic and other arguments by subsidy
proponents are accepted or found to be true, there is still a lack of ra-
tional reasoning for subsidizing professional sports stadiums from a fed-
eral tax level. In the following paragraphs, this argument is explained
and justified.
Where federal taxpayers shoulder the burden of helping to finance
local stadiums through lost revenues on tax-exempt bonds, there exists
an argument of disproportionality. Admittedly, the amount of the finan-
cial burden suffered by federal taxpayers is relatively small when consid-
ered on a per taxpayer basis. However, when considered aggregately,
one cannot help but wonder why federal taxpayers in states such as Flor-
ida, Alabama, and Mississippi should pay anything for the Rose Garden
to be constructed in Portland, Oregon. 37 It is highly doubtful that any
significant number of Trailblazer fans resides in these three states, and
even more unlikely that if they do that any of them will ever enjoy the
benefits of visiting the Rose Garden. It is even more absurd to think
that any worker in one of these three states would be willing to commute
over 2500 miles to enjoy the benefit of a seasonally created, minimum
wage paying, temporary job at the arena. Simply put, the arguments
favoring taxpayer subsidy of stadium construction lack any validity or
credibility when considered only on the federal level.
First, consider the argument of job creation. Even if the construction
of a new professional sports stadium will create jobs, what benefit does
the federal government receive from providing tax-exempt status to
bonds used to lure a team from one location to another. Taken on a
national level, the location of a new stadium should make little differ-
ence to the federal taxpayer. For example, if a new stadium creates fif-
teen hundred new jobs, the total number of national jobs will increase by
fifteen hundred irrespective of whether those jobs are located in Miami
or Atlanta. While there may be some enticement to the federal govern-
ment in steering job growth towards more depressed regions of the
country, the federal taxability or non-taxability of bonds does not pro-
vide national leaders with the power to effect such incentive. Bond issu-
ance for stadium construction generally occurs on a state level. Whether
a team will receive these bonds is a decision that will be made by state
leaders and citizens. Thus, there really is no benefit to the federal tax-
payer in terms of job creation.
137. See Lathrope, supra note 9, at 1161. As an example, Lathrope indicates that there
appears to be a lack of policy justification for federal taxpayers in North Dakota or New
Mexico, to be required to subsidize a move of the Oilers from Houston to Nashville. See id.
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Second, the argument that a new stadium will stimulate economic
growth, assuming it is valid, does not translate into a benefit to the fed-
eral taxpayer.' Similar to job creation, economic growth from the con-
struction of a new sports stadium should occur irrespective of where the
new stadium is located within the United States. The national economy
is comprised of more local economies, and although there may be some
slight marginal difference in total national economic growth due to the
location of the stadium, such a difference should be very minimal and
make little difference on a purely federal tax basis.
Likewise, any argument that a new stadium and professional sports
team provide intangible benefits does not translate to the national level.
Specifically, the argument that a city becomes major league by having a
big-league sports franchise cannot be carried to the federal level. The
nation receives no intangible benefit or status by having a sports team in
Miami instead of Cleveland. Additionally, new business will not be cre-
ated nationally, or attracted to the United States because a new stadium
was built in Miami rather than Cleveland.
The only argument that has marginal transferability is that of inner
city revitalization. The construction of a new stadium may provide a
benefit in revitalizing an inner city region of the nation. However, like
the job creation and economic growth argument, the ability to effect this
change and specifically target such revitalization is not one that is held
by federal politicians as a result of the tax-exempt status of bonds used
for stadium construction. As previously mentioned, issuance of these
bonds is controlled by state and local government. Consequently, the
federal taxpayer seems to have little incentive to continue this subsidy
based on a revitalization argument.
The economic arguments by stadium subsidy proponents advocating
that this expenditure of public funds is cost-justified simply have not
been historically proven to be valid. Even if all of the proponents' argu-
ments were accepted as true, the touted benefits are limited to the state
level. It does not appear that a federal taxpayer would derive the same
benefits as a state taxpayer from the construction of a new stadium, as-
suming the claimed benefits are realized. It is also unlikely that the new
trend for constructing new stadiums will significantly slow down.139 So,
where real life has proven that stadiums can be built without forcing
taxpayers to assume new taxes or lose substantial tax revenues, and
where the benefits of new stadiums do not translate to the federal tax-
138. See id. at 1159.
139. See Somers, supra note 99, at Al.
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payer, perhaps the following proposals would help to strike a more equi-
table balance in the subsidy of professional sports facilities.
VI. TAX POLICY OPTIONS
The following subsections will present several suggestions for im-
proving tax policy in this particular area. Recognizably, these measures
would not necessarily end professional sports franchise subsidy, rather,
they would help to ensure more equitable funding, with significantly
lower subsidy issued under more carefully thought out basis for
compensation.
A. Eliminate Federal Tax Financing of Stadiums and Arenas
Sports facilities and stadiums can survive without burdening federal
taxpayers with their costs. Within an eight-year period spanning the late
seventies and early eighties, Miami taxpayers rejected four separate pro-
posals to pay for renovations of Joe Robbie Stadium."' Following the
fourth rejection, the stadium owner proceeded with the renovation,
funding it through the lease of clubhouse seats and luxury boxes.141 Sim-
ilar examples exist, collectively pointing to the plausibility that the IRS
tax code could be amended to eliminate the tax-exempt status of bonds
issued for the construction of sporting venues.
1. Internal Revenue Code Revision
As a solution to the unfair nature of requiring federal taxpayers to
subsidize stadiums, Dennis Zimmerman's proposal that the IRC be
amended to completely eliminate federal tax-exempt status of bonds
used to pay for the construction of sports stadiums and arenas should be
adopted. 142 By eliminating the federal tax-exempt status of bonds used
to pay for the construction of sports stadiums and arenas, federal taxpay-
ers would be relieved of the unfair burden requiring them to subsidize
professional sport franchises.
Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan proposed another potential
amendment to the code entitled the Stop Tax-Exempt Arena Debt Issu-
ance Act or STADIA.143 Under this proposal, Internal Revenue Code
Section 141 would be amended to provide that bond issues whose pro-
140. See GREENBERG & GRAY, supra note 5, at 362.
141. See id. at 362.
142. See Zimmerman, supra note 30.
143. S. 122, 105th Cong. (1997); reintroduced S. 434, 105th Cong. (1997); also introduced
in the House of Representatives H.R. 2097, 105th Cong. (1997).
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ceeds are used to provide professional sports facilities with the lesser of
$5 million or five percent of total bond proceeds shall be included in
private activity bonds, and not qualified for tax-exempt status. 144 Under
the proposal, the denial of tax-exempt status would be fazed in by al-
lowing exceptions to the amendment for bonds approved before June 14,
1996.145 The Act, first introduced in the Senate on January 21, 1997, and
in the House on February 12, 1997, has not seen significant action, hav-
ing been referred to committee following each introduction."
Although this bill looks like a quality remedy, it might have difficulty
passing. Politicians face increasing pressure to either attract new profes-
sional sports teams or prevent the injustice of teams divorcing current
cities for new locations. 47 Consequently, support of Moynihan's bill is
politically unpopular. No legislator would want to be viewed by their
constituents in a light that could be cast as anti-stadium, or especially as
an opponent of the current professional sporting franchise. So, even
though the bill makes sense, it will not easily pass. Though an affirma-
tive vote for the bill would not mean a legislature was against the con-
struction of stadiums ipso facto, there is the real threat that tax-paying
constituents would not be able to separate the issue of whether tax sub-
sidy should be used to build a stadium from the question of whether a
stadium should be built at all.
Complete elimination of the tax-exemption would likely face the
same difficulties in passage as Moynihan's proposal. Though the two are
slightly different because STADIA still allows minimal tax-exempt bene-
fits, the two proposals are not different in the respect that constituents
might perceive the advocation of either as a move in opposition to cur-
rent professional sport franchises location in their states. However, even
though this may be true, the rationale behind the proposals is still sound
and should be followed.
The adoption of either the Moynihan or Zimmerman proposal would
undoubtedly cause the cost to finance the bond debt to increase because
of the lost tax-exempt status, but this might not be a bad effect. Where
the cost of debt service will be increased, issuers will be forced to look
more closely at the economic effects of issuing these bonds. The slight
increase in cost of financing should also have the effect of forcing issuing
144. See id. at § 2.
145. See id. at § 2(b).
146. See Bill Tracking Report, S. 122, 105th Cong. (1997); see also H.R. 721, 105th Cong.
(1997).
147. See Mitten & Burton, supra note 60, at 98.
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parties to look more closely at stadiums as investments. However, the
greatest benefit that either of these two proposals would have is that
federal taxpayers would no longer be paying or would be paying much
less for this specific subsidy that they have almost no chance to derive
any kind of benefit from.
By disallowing states to issue federal tax-exempt bonds for stadiums,
teams would no longer hold the same power in the bidding war for new
stadiums. A move to a different city by a professional team would not
necessarily result in greater tax subsidy where no federal tax-exempt
bond could be issued to pay for construction. By eliminating this federal
tax-exemption and taking away this leverage, teams may have more in-
centive to stay at home and politicians would ultimately satisfy the popu-
lar desires of constituents.
As an additional benefit, where bond issuers are unable to qualify for
tax-exempt status, legislatures could quickly shift the cost of satisfying
bond obligations back to the team. Team leases of stadiums and arenas
would likely become more equitable. Where bond obligations could be
satisfied with stadium revenues, state and local taxpayers should also
likely feel some level of relief from the bond service burden they now
carry because of the adoption of either new federal tax policy proposal
relating to stadium bond financing.
2. Require Greater Returns from Stadium Revenue
One potential remedy to the tax subsidy of professional sport
franchises is to require better or more specific return on the dollar. Re-
quiring a greater return can only be accomplished if federal tax-exempt
bonds are either changed or eliminated. Under the present code, bonds
are classified as PAT and lose tax-exempt status when over ten percent
of the money used to satisfy their repayment is derived from the stadium
or arena.148 If the federal tax-exempt bond were eliminated as sug-
gested, this would no longer be an issue. States could tap the most logi-
cal revenue stream-stadium revenue-to satisfy bond obligations.
Stadiums could then pay for themselves instead of requiring taxpayers to
shoulder the burden.
Furthermore, by requiring costs to be repaid with stadium revenues,
leases would be more equitable as discussed above, and teams and
leagues might look more closely at the costs of construction. Requiring
the money to come from the investment itself, may prompt politicians to
148. See I.R.C. § 141 (1999).
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undertake more careful analysis of the risk versus return used as a basis
for deciding whether or not to construct the new stadium.
B. Limit Referenda Campaign Spending
Where stadium and tax proponents are often able to outspend oppo-
nents, the public is educated about the potential stadium subsidies
through tainted lenses and taxpayers are less likely to hear both sides of
the issue. By placing limits on the level of money spent to rally support
for proposed stadium referenda, taxpayers would likely be placed in a
position to hear both sides of the debate and make more informed deci-
sions. This limit would have to be adopted by state legislatures on a one-
by-one basis because the referenda power is unique and specific to each
state. Unfortunately, a measure of this nature would likely face very
difficult constitutional challenges.149 If adopted, however, it would cre-
ate the opportunity for more informed tax policy decision making.
This measure would provide sound benefits if adopted. It would pro-
vide for more informed discussion, debate and consideration of stadium
proposals. These benefits would likely follow even in the case that the
federal tax exemption is not eliminated. Should the federal tax-exemp-
tion continue, adoption of this measure would provide for more rational
spending of tax subsidy, and perhaps even reduce the federal tax dollars
lost where state taxpayers may more frequently choose to oppose sub-
sidy for stadium construction. Even if the federal subsidy is eliminated,
this campaign balancing measure would both aid state citizens in voting
as informed citizens for referenda and help to bring to light all aspects of
prospective stadium construction.
C. Implement League Policies Restricting Team Movement to Slow
Stadium Growth and Decrease the Level of Federal Tax Dollars Lost.
One of the significant, yet generally unacknowledged reasons polit-
ical forces agree to build new stadiums is that team owners have the
power, subject to league rules, to relocate their franchises in an effort to
149. See David R. Lagasse, Note, Undue Influence: Corporate Political Speech, Power and
the Initiative Process, 61 BROOK. L. REv. 1347 (1995); Matthew J. Geyer, Note, Statutory Lim-
itations on Corporate Spending in Ballot Measure Campaigns: The Case for Constitutionality,
36 HASTINGS LJ. 433 (1985); Daniel H. Lowenstein, Campaign Spending and Ballot Proposi-
tions: Recent Experience, Public Choice Theory and the First Amendment, 29 UCLA L. REv.
505 (1982); Elizabeth Garrett, Money, Agenda Setting, and Direct Democracy, 77 Tnx. L. R~v.
1845 (1999).
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attain better stadium deals.15 0 This ability to hop cities gives teams great
bargaining leverage in negotiating new facility construction contracts
and stadium and arena leases.' 51 If teams were relieved of this uncon-
trolled power, decisions to build or not to build could be made after
more reasonable and thoughtful consideration. This should also prevent
professional teams from extorting federal tax subsidy dollars from cities
as a requirement to either retain or attract them.
This solution could only be carried out at the national level. Con-
gress would have to regulate the movement of professional sport teams.
It is unreasonable to believe that given broader power leagues would
curtail the movement of franchises. Although leagues have challenged
the movement of some professional sport franchises, 5 2 the motive is
generally not to protect taxpayers or host cities.'5 3 Leagues have a rec-
ognizable incentive in continuing to allow teams to move to the commu-
nities in which the greatest overall potential revenue may be
generated. 5 4 Leagues also derive great benefit from the construction of
new facilities. Where a new stadium or venue can significantly increase
franchise value, 5 5 and league exposure, sporting leagues are thrilled by
the construction of new facilities.'5 6 It seems unlikely that leagues would
strip teams of such a powerful bargaining tool for attaining new
stadiums.
150. Following the Ninth Circuit's ruling in the antitrust suit involving the move of the
Raiders football team from Oakland to Los Angeles, it appears that any professional sports
league may be at risk of antitrust violations for prohibiting a team from moving. See
Lathrope, supra note 9, at 1149 (citing Los Angeles Mem'l Coliseum Comm. v. National Foot-
ball League, 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir. 1984)).
151. See Mitten & Burton, supra note 60, at 60-61.
152. See generally, National Basketball Ass'n v. SDC Basketball Club, Inc., 815 F.2d 562
(9th Cir. 1987); Piazza v. Major League Baseball, 831 F. Supp 420 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
153. See Mitten & Burton, supra note 60, at 104 (citing personal animosity towards spe-
cific owners such as Al Davis, Bill Veeck and Charlie Finley, as a common basis for league
attempts to prevent franchise relocation).
154. See id. at 103. The total revenue generated by location in one community versus
another includes the amount that may come from favorable stadium leases and taxpayer sub-
sidy. See id.
155. See Lathrope, supra note 9, at 1155 (citing John Riley, Where The Grass is Always...
Greener, NEWSDAY, Aug. 18, 1996). A team's revenues may increase by as much as 40% from
moving into a new stadium, thus resulting in increases to franchise values in the ranges of $30
million to $50 million or more. See id. See also, Is the Boom Cresting?, STADIUM & ARENA
FiNANCING, Sept. 21, 1998, at 1 (indicating that the difference in team franchise values often
can be traced to the stadium situation).
156. See Hartel, supra note 87, at 602. Hartel points to the NFL as an example of a
professional league that is very satisfied with public subsidization of new stadiums. See id.
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Professional sport franchise relocation restrictions have been pro-
posed in Congress, but have not been adopted. 5 7 Under The Profes-
sional Sports Franchise Relocation Act of 1998, Massachusetts
Representative Martin T. Meehan proposed regulations that would ex-
empt leagues from antitrust liability for restricting team movement and
control the process for granting team mobility.158 This bill, along with
others such as The Sports Antitrust Reform Act of 1996, have been
aimed at the same general target. 5 9 These proposals suggest the adop-
tion of certain criteria to be applied and satisfied before professional
sport franchises would be allowed to move.160 These acts would have
been considered minor exemptions to the antitrust laws.
161
It would seem unduly harsh and probably unconstitutional to com-
pletely prohibit the movement of professional sport franchises, but some
level of restriction would certainly help to create a more rational bar-
gaining process between teams and host cities regarding relocation. 62
The criteria of the many bills already proposed and unadopted provide
good starting points for legislative reform of relocation requirements.
The most important part of any act created to solve this issue must be
measures designed to provide for rational decision making, with a fair
amount of time for debate, discussion and analysis.
157. See Safir, supra note 94, at 955; see also Mitten & Burton, supra note 60, at 128.
Mitten and Burton provide a plethora of examples of proposed federal legislative bills that
would regulate professional team movement in some manner. See id. at 131-40. A partial list
includes: 1) The Professional Sports Franchise Relocation Act, introduced in 1985 by Con-
gressman Ronald V. Dellums; 2) The Professional Football Stabilization Act, introduced in
1985 by Senator Arlen Specter; 3) The Sports Community Protection and Stability Act, intro-
duced in 1985 by Senator Dennis DeConcini; 4) The Professional Sports Team Community
Protection Act, introduced in 1984 by Senator Slade Gorton; 5) The Fan Freedom and Com-
munity Protection Act, introduced in 1995 by Representative Martin R. Hoke; 6) The Fans
Rights Act, initially introduced by Senators John Glen and Michael DeWine; 7) The Profes-
sional Sports Franchise Relocation Act, introduced in 1996 by Senator Arlen Specter; and 8)
The Professional Sports Antitrust Clarification Act, sponsored by Senator Strom Thurmond in
1996. See id. at 131-39.
158. See H.R. 3817, 105th Cong. (1998).
159. See 104 S. 1767, 104th Cong. (1996).
160. See H.R. 3817, 105' Cong. (1998); 104 S. 1767, 104"' Cong. (1996).
161. See Safir, supra note 94, at 955. Safir indicates that of seven recent Congressional
bills proposed to regulate franchise movement, all provide some form of limited antitrust im-
munity for leagues. See id.
162. For a discussion on the constitutionality of restricting professional sport team move-
ment see Lisa J. Tobin-Rubio, Casenote, Eminent Domain and the Commerce Clause Defense:
City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 41 U. Mr.MNn L. REv. 1185 (1996).
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VII. CONCLUSION
Many avenues of taxation have been utilized to pay for the construc-
tion of new sporting stadiums and arenas from both the federal, and
state and local levels, effectively subsidizing professional sport
franchises. The arguments favoring current tax policies have lost actual
credibility due to real studies debunking exacerbated economic claims.
Furthermore, any argument that professional sports need subsidization
is strained where teams and leagues are now a big time business, gener-
ating large revenues through media broadcasting rights revenues, ticket
sales, merchandising and corporate sponsorship.
The professional sports tax subsidy debate takes on a much different
flavor when federal tax policy is separated from state tax policy. Under
this analysis, it is apparent that arguments in favor of public financing of
sports stadiums simply do not hold true when considered on a federal
level. Perhaps the states should be left to their own policy discretion in
dolling out state taxpayer money to professional sports franchises. Nev-
ertheless, it is obvious that the time has come to take steps to protect the
federal taxpayers from the injustice of subsidizing multi-million dollar
businesses with little or no real benefit in return.
Several measures exist that could alleviate the unfair burden placed
on federal taxpayers to subsidize professional sports stadium construc-
tion. One measure seems to be better and more logical than the rest:
amend the Internal Revenue Code to either restrict or eliminate the tax-
exempt status of bonds used to finance stadium construction.
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